Al Noor Mosque. Photo: RNZ / Samuel Rillstone
The supervisor mentoring a junior 111 call-taker says she would like to think a call about the terrorist's manifesto would have been acted on differently had they realised the threat was genuine.
The supervisor, who has name suppression, told the inquest into the murder of 51 worshippers at Al Noor Mosque and Linwood Islamic Centre that she could not recall if she ever thought about upgrading the call to a priority 1 event.
Earlier evidence in the inquest showed a parliamentary staffer's call about Brenton Tarrant's manifesto was categorised as NATSEC (national security) priority 2.
The call-taker told the court she categorised it that way as it was an unusual call and it was not clear when and where the attack would take place.
The supervisor had agreed with the call-taker's decision.
The caller relaying second hand information and seeming confused about the information being given led her and the call-taker to believe it was of a lesser priority, the supervisor told the court.
But counsel assisting the coroner, Abigail Van Echten, suggested to the supervisor that it should have been a priority 1 call because of the threat of violence.
Counsel assisting the coroner Abigail Van Echten Photo: Iain McGregor
The supervisor ultimately agreed the threat of violence was highlighted in the phone call but continued to believe labelling it a priority 2 was the right call to make at the time.
Looking back, the supervisor said what was relayed by the parliamentary staffer was "important information".
She said she was concerned enough about the call to alert her own supervisor but could not recall at what point she got up and spoke to him - or what information she relayed to him.
When asked if her opinion on the call would have changed had she been aware the attack of Al Noor Mosque was already underway, she said: "I'd like to think I would handle it differently."
When questioned about what went wrong on the day - the supervisor said the question was tricky as she did not know how to answer it.
"I think that question would be better suited to the comms management team."
Deputy chief Coroner Brigitte Windley. Photo: Iain McGregor
Earlier in her evidence, she became so upset that a lawyer stood up and requested she be able to take a break.
She broke down in tears while speaking of the moment she learnt there was an active shooter in Christchurch.
She continued to try to speak before lawyer Kathryn Dalziel asked deputy chief Coroner Brigitte Windley if she could be given a break to calm down.
Police constable Dara Taylor. Photo: Iain McGregor
Police dispatcher did not know of Linwood mosque threat until days later
A police dispatcher would have sent units to immediately evacuate Linwood Islamic Centre on the day of the Christchurch terror attack if she was aware of the threat.
Police constable Dara Taylor was working as the channel 1 dispatcher on the day of the attack but it was not until four days after the massacre that she became aware of the parliamentary staffer's 111 call.
At the same time as that call, priority 1 firearms events were populating Taylor's screen and became her primary focus.
Under cross-examination by Van Echten, Taylor said having the information which said Linwood mosque was a threat, alongside knowing of the shooting at Al Noor Mosque, she would have acted quickly.
"Again this is with hindsight, (I) would send someone there straight away to evacuate everyone in that mosque, and then clear and then have AOS there for if he showed up there.
"So I would not have just two officers standing outside just in case, it would be an evacuation."
Had the parliamentary staffer's call been categorised as a priority 1 event, Taylor said it was possible that she would have seen it while the attack was underway.
Taylor was also critical of the different systems police and ambulance used to repay information to each other about events.
Evidence shows that just one message was sent from police to St John about the attack, with Taylor saying it was more efficient to have people relaying information in person as they worked in the same communication centre.
"As ambulance operate on a slightly different database, it was drawn to my attention that day that Intercad was not efficient and that the messengers was more efficient to communicate. That is because ambulance do not operate on the same system as police and fire which … I don't know why that is.
She said she would be lying if she said it had not been an issue during other situations.
When asked if anything had been done to improve that, Taylor said she was not aware of anything except "than constant frustration by front-line staff and dispatchers".
"But that would be my one takeaway from this, that ambulance get funding from the government to update that system so they are all the same."
Recalling what it was like in the communication centre that day, Taylor said it was the most "chaotic" event she had experienced in her career, both as a sworn and non-sworn staff member.
Taylor said everyone in the communications centre who was not bound to a desk with a headset on was soon running around, relaying important information to team leaders and dispatchers.
Every free seat was quickly taken, she said.
"There was no idle hands," she said, "everyone was finding work and making a response happen".
The inquest will examine the following 10 issues over the next six weeks:
- The events of 15 March 2019 from the commencement of the attack until the terrorist's formal interview by police
- The response times and entry processes of police and ambulance officers at each mosque
- The triage and medical response at each mosque
- The steps that were taken to apprehend the offender
- The role of, and processes undertaken by, Christchurch Hospital in responding to the attack
- Co-ordination between emergency services and first responders
- Whether the terrorist had any direct assistance from any other person on 15 March 2019
- If raised by immediate family, and to the extent it can be ascertained, the final movements and time of death for each of the deceased
- The cause of death for each of the victims and whether any deaths could have been avoided
- Whether Al Noor Mosque emergency exit door in the south-east corner of the main prayer room failed to function during the attack and, if so, why?
The inquest continues.
